We consider the problem of designing fast and strategyproof exchanges for dynamic resource allocation problems in distributed systems. The exchange is implemented as a sequence of auctions, with dynamically arriving requests from agents matched with each auction. Each auction is associated with some consignment of the resources from a single seller. We provide a simple Virtual Worlds (VW) construction, that extends a fast and strategyproof mechanism for a single auction to apply to this sequence-of-auctions setting. Rather than match each buyer with a single auction, the VW mechanism allows buyers to be considered for multiple auctions while retaining strategyproofness.
INTRODUCTION
Computation is increasing distributed and performed by devices representing multiple individuals and businesses. Consider a data staging scenario, in which multiple users with PDAs are in Times Square and trying to read and access corporate databases. Each user would like to stage (encrypted) data within nearby physical environment to reduce latencies. A socially-efficient allocation of data staging capabilities in Times Square would allocate capacity to maximize the total value across all users.
With cooperative users, and other computational considerations aside, one could simply ask devices to state their utilities for various outcomes and then implement the socially-efficient allocation. However, rational and self-interested users would overstate their utility for the ability to stage their own data, and cause the system performance to quickly unravel.
In this paper we propose a fast and scalable mechanism for dynamic resource allocation. The mechanism is novel, in that it allows agents to be matched against a sequence of auctions while 
THE VIRTUALWORLDS MECHANISM
To start, we model a simplified problem with one seller, with units of a homogeneous resource available in each period of time Ø. Request agent arrives at time Ø , with private information about her value Ú for × units of resource for duration Ð . All request agents (RA's) are assumed to have patience ¡, which is the amount of time that any RA will wait to receive the resource. We assume that the arrival time, and patience, is known to the system. The mechanism allows an RA to be matched against a sequence of auctions. The RA receives resources from the first auction in which it is a winner, and immediately upon a successful match. However, the RA's final payment is not determined until the first period , with Ø Ø · ¡ (i.e. after its patience duration). Let ÔÚ ÖØ´ µ denote the current payment calculated for agent . This is defined to be zero for an agent that has not yet received a match, and otherwise will monotonically decrease while the agent remains in the system.
The VW mechanism maintains a set of active bidders, AE , at the start of each period. These are the RA's with Ø ¡ Ø Ø , that are either winners in some previous period with ÔÚ ÖØ´ µ ¼, or have not yet received a successful match. The set AE includes the agents that have arrived into the system between period ½ and period . Let Ï AE denote the set of active bidders that are already winners, at the start of period . This captures the essential information about the state of the system. In VW, each winner has an associated virtual world while it is active. Definition. The Virtual World for active bidder in period defines the state of the system that would exist if bidder had not arrived until period but everything else was unchanged.
Let ÎÏ denote the set of active bidders that are already winners at the start of period , and also the bidders that win for the first time in period . [3] For each winner , with Ü £ ½ , repeat step [2] with all bids except this bid. Call this solution Ü . Let Ô denote the perunit bid price, Ú × of the first bid that is not a winner in Ü £ but is a winner in Ü , or zero if there is no such bid.
[4] Implement allocation Ü £ , with each winner with Ü £ ½ making payment × Ô .
The payment ÔÚ ÖØ´ µ to a winning agent is initialized to the payment computed in this LOS scheme. In addition, the new winners are added to the set of agents with virtual worlds, ÎÏ . Then, in the virtual world for agent , the set of winners Ï ´ µ is initialized to Ï . Phase II. For each virtual world, ¾ ÎÏ , run the LOS scheme twice. First, run the LOS scheme with AE Ò Ï ´ µ, where this includes agent . If bidder is a winner, then update the price ÔÚ ÖØ´ µ, to the smallest of the current ÔÚ ÖØ´ µ and the price in this virtual world. Second, run the LOS scheme with AE Ò´Ï ´ µ µ, i.e. without bidder . Propagate this as the state of the virtual world for the next period. The first stage of Phase II is not necessary in the first period that the VW is created.
The effect of Phase II is to compute the payment in period for an RA that has been matched in the previous period, as though it just arrived into the system for the first time in period . If the RA wins for a lower payment in period , then this payment becomes the new VW payment.
Interestingly, we can establish the strategyproofness of the VW mechanism as a simple corollary to the incentive properties of LOS. The VW mechanism maintains properties:
Exactness. Bids are either accepted in full or denied.
Monotonicity. If a bid´× Ú µ loses, then a bid´× ¼ Ú ¼ µ with
Participation. Only winners make payments. Critical. The payment is exactly equal to the minimal price at which a bid, for the true size, would have still been accepted.
Taken together, these properties are sufficient for strategyproofness, and imply our main result: THEOREM 1. Truth-revelation of´× Ð Ú µ is a dominant strategy for RA's in the VIRTUALWORLDS mechanism.
PROOF. (sketch) Exactness and participation trivially hold, while monotonicity is inherited from the greedy LOS scheme. The VW ¾ We are careful to allocate an RA with reported length Ð to any auction with Ð Ð , rather than some subset of auctions with Ð "close" to Ð . Otherwise, there could be an incentive for an RA to overstate its required duration Ð in order to change the pool of auctions with which it is matched and change its payment. 
EMBEDDING WITHIN AN EXCHANGE
In a practical resource allocation mechanism there are multiple sellers, in addition to multiple buyers. In this section, we briefly explain how the VW mechanism is embedded within a two-sided exchange via a consignment and pooling mechanism. The reader is referred to the full paper for complete details [4] . Figure 1 depicts the overall architecture of the exchange. First, to provide scalability, incoming RA's are divided into multiple pools, with each pool associated with a single VW mechanism. New RAs are queued up in the system. Before starting a new round of auctions, each queued RA is assigned to join one of the auction pools, in round-robin fashion. Second, arriving SA's are also queued, before the resources are chunked into a consignment of resources and scheduled to a sequence of auctions (possibly within multiple pools). Each auction is associated with a consignment of resources from a single SA. The auction pools operate independently of each other and are monitored by the exchange. The basic information a pool needs to start a new auction is the current RAs assigned to the pool, the SA assigned to the next auction, and the consignment of capacity that it will make available.
Arriving SA's report a capacity and total duration Ð . The consignments are constructed to provide each SA with access to the same total number of auctions, irrespective of its reported´ Ð µ.
Instead, the consignment within a single auction is scaled. This is useful because it removes any incentive for an SA to overstate its available capacity. In the longer version of this paper [4] , we analyze the remaining, but limited, opportunity that can exist for an SA to understate its capacity and increase its payments. We have implemented VIRTUALWORLDS on Sun's JXTA platform and Berkeley DB and obtained initial positive results. We are deploying pools on multiple servers for scalability and are currently conducting further validation of the performance across a number of different resource allocation scenarios. For the future, we will extend and deploy the mechanism for computational grids.
